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Abstract
Tripwire isan integritycheckingprogram writtenfor
the UNIX environment. It gives system administra-
tors the ability to monitor ﬁle systems for added,
deleted, and modiﬁed ﬁles. Intended to aid intru-
sion detection, Tripwire was ofﬁcially released on
November 2, 1992. It is being actively used at thou-
sands of sites around the world. Published in vol-
ume 26 of comp.sources.unix on the USENET
andarchivedatnumerousFTPsitesaroundtheworld,
Tripwire is widely available and widely distributed.
It is recommended by various computer security re-
sponse teams, including the CERT and CIAC.
Thispaperbeginsbymotivatingtheneedforanin-
tegritychecker bypresentingahypotheticalsituation
anysystemadministratorcouldface. Anoverviewof
Tripwire is then described, emphasizing the salient
aspectsofTripwireconﬁgurationthatsupportsitsuse
at sites employing modern variants of the UNIX op-
erating system. Experiences with how Tripwire has
been used in “in the ﬁeld” are then presented, along
with some conjectures on the prevalence and extent
of system breakins. Novel uses of Tripwire and no-
table conﬁgurations of Tripwire are also presented.
￿This paperappeared as [8]
1 Introduction
Tripwireisan integritycheckingprogram writtenfor
the UNIX environment that gives system administra-
tors the ability to monitor ﬁle systems for added,
deleted, and modiﬁed ﬁles. Intended to aid intru-
sion detection, Tripwire was ofﬁcially released on
November 2, 1992,1 and is being actively used at
thousands of sites around the world. Published in
volume26ofcomp.sources.unix andarchived
at numerous FTP sites around the world, Tripwire is
widely available and widely distributed. It is now
recommended by many computer security response
teams, including the ARPA Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT).
Testing of Tripwire started in September 1992.
Since then, its design and code have been available
for scrutiny by the public at large. The design and
implementation are described in detail in [6].
An intensive beta test period resulted in Tripwire
being ported to over two dozen variants of UNIX,
including several versions neither author had ever
encountered. Currently entering its seventh (and
possibly last) revision, Tripwire has met our design
goals of being sufﬁciently portable, scalable, conﬁg-
1That release date was chosen for its historical signiﬁcance
as well as being convenientto our developmentschedule.urable, ﬂexible, extensible, secure, manageable, and
malleable to enjoy widespread use.
This paper documents some of our experiences
and discoveries based on our development and use
of Tripwire. It begins by motivating the use of an
integrity checking tool (such as Tripwire) through
the presentation of a hypothetical scenerio that a
UNIX system administrator could face. Next, we
present an overview of Tripwire’s design, emphasiz-
ingthesalientconﬁgurationaspectsthatallowitsuse
in modern UNIX variants. We then discuss experi-
ences gathered from Tripwireusers since itsSeptem-
ber 1992 release. These stories seem to conﬁrm the
practicality of this integritychecking scheme. There
are at least seven documented cases of Tripwire no-
tifying system administrators of intruders’ system
tampering. We present our conjectures on the preva-
lence and extent of system breakins based on our
data. We also describe novel uses of Tripwire and
surprising conﬁgurations that have been reported to
us. Feedback that has shaped the direction of Trip-
wire development is also presented.
Tripwire stands as an example how a simple idea
can be developed into a general and effective tool to
enhance UNIX security while also posing almost no
threat to the systems under guard. Unlike programs
like password crackers or ﬂaw probes, Tripwire can-
not be turned against a system to identify or exploit
weaknesses or ﬂaws. It is also an example of how a
program may have uses unanticipated by its authors.
2 Motivation
2.1 A cautionary tale2
Ellen runs a network of 50 networked UNIX comput-
ers representing nearly a dozen vendors— from PCs
runningXenixtoaCray runningUnicos. Thismorn-
ing, when she logged in to her workstation, Ellen
was a bit surprised when the lastlog message in-
dicated thatroot hadloggedintothesystemat3AM.
2This is taken from [7].
Ellenthoughtshewastheonlyonewiththerootpass-
word. Needless to say, this was not something Ellen
was happy to see.
A bitmore investigationrevealed thatsomeone—
certainlynotEllen—hadloggedonasroot, notonly
on her machinebut also on several othermachines in
her company. Unfortunately, the intruder deleted all
the accounting and audit ﬁles justbefore loggingout
of each machine. Ellen suspects that the intruder (or
intruders) ran the compiler and editor on several of
the machines. Being concerned aboutsecurity, Ellen
is worried that the intruder may have thus changed
one or more system ﬁles, thus enabling future unau-
thorized access as well as compromising sensitive
information. How can she tell which ﬁles have been
altered withoutrestoring each systemfrom backups?
PoorEllenisfacedwithoneofthemosttediousand
frustrating jobs a system administrator can have —
determining which, if any, ﬁles and programs have
been altered without authorization. File modiﬁca-
tions may occur in a number of ways: an intruder,
an authorized user violating local policy or controls,
or even the rare piece of maliciouscode alteringsys-
tem executables as others are run. It might even be
the case that some system hardware or software is
silently corrupting vital system data.
In each of these situations, the problem is not so
muchknowingthatthingsmighthave been changed;
rather, the problem is verifying exactly which ﬁles
— out of tens of thousands of ﬁles in dozens of
gigabytesofdiskondozensofdifferent architectures
—mighthavebeenchanged. Notonlyisitnecessary
to examine every one of these ﬁles, but it is also
necessary to examine directory information as well.
Ellen will need to check for deleted or added ﬁles,
too. With so many different systems and ﬁles, how
is Ellen going to manage the situation?
Resolving such a situation would prove tedious
and labor-intensive for even the most well-prepared
system administrator. Consider the problems facing
system administrators who use simple checklisting
schemes:
22.2 The resulting challenges
Established techniques for monitoring ﬁle systems
for potentially dangerous changes include main-
taining checklists, comparison copies, checksum
records, or a long history of backup tapes for this
kind of contingency [4, 2]. However, these methods
are costlytomaintain,pronetoerror, andsusceptible
to easy spooﬁng by a malicious intruder.
For instance, the UNIX utility find(1) is of-
ten used to generate a checklist of system ﬁles, per-
haps in conjunction with ls(1). This list is then
saved and compared using diff(1) to determine
which ﬁles have been added or deleted, and to ﬁnd
whichﬁleshaveconﬂictingmodiﬁcationtimes,own-
ership, or sizes. An added level of security could
be added by augmenting these lists with informa-
tion from sum(8) or cksum(8), as is done by the
crc check program included with COPS [3].
However, numerous shortcomingsin these simple
checklisting schemes prevent them from being com-
pletely trustworthy and useful. First, the list of ﬁles
and associated checksums may be tedious to main-
tain because of its size. Second, using timestamps,
checksums,and ﬁlesizes does not necessarily ensure
the integrity of each ﬁle (e.g., once intruders gain
root privileges, they may alter timestamps and even
the checklistsat will). Furthermore, changes to a ﬁle
may be made without changing its length or check-
sum generated by the sum(8) program. And this
entireapproach presumesthatls(1), sum(8),a n d
the other programs have not been compromised! In
the case of a serious attack, a conscientious adminis-
trator needs stronger proof that important ﬁles have
remained unchanged. But what proof can be offered
that is sufﬁcient for this situation?
2.3 The resulting wishlist
A successful integrity checking scheme requires a
high level of automation — both in generating the
output list and in generating the input list of ﬁles. If
theschemeisdifﬁculttouse, itmaynotbeusedoften
enough — or worse, used improperly. The automa-
tionshouldincludeasimplewaytodescribeportions
of the ﬁlesystem to be traversed. Additionally, in
cases where ﬁles are likely to be added, changed,
or deleted, it must be easy to update the checklist
database. For instance, ﬁles such as /etc/motd
may change daily or weekly. It should not be neces-
sary to regenerate the entire database every time this
single ﬁle changes to maintain database accuracy.
Ideally, our integrity checking program could be
run regularly from cron(8) to enable detection of
ﬁlechangesinatimelymanner. Itshouldalsobepos-
sible to run the program manually to check a smaller
setof ﬁles forchanges. Asthe administratorislikely
tocomparethedifferencesbetweenthe“base”check-
list and the current ﬁle list frequently, it is important
that the program be easy to invoke and use.
A useful integrity checker must generate output
that is easy to scan. A checker generating three
hundred lines of output from each machine for the
system administrator to analyze daily would be self-
defeating — this is far too much to ask of even
the most amazingly dedicated system administrator!
Thus, the program must allow the speciﬁcation of
ﬁlesystem “exceptions” that can change without be-
ing reported, and hence reduce “noise.” For exam-
ple, changes in system log ﬁle sizes are expected,
but a change in inode number, ownership, or ﬁle
modes is cause for alarm. However, a change in
any value stored in the inodes (except for the access
timestamp) for system binaries in /bin should be
reported. Properly speciﬁed, the integrity checker
should operate unobtrusively, notifying Ellen when
a ﬁle changes outside the speciﬁed bounds, and oth-
erwise running quietly.
Finally, assuming that Ellen wants to run the in-
tegrity checker on every machine in her network, the
integrity checker should allow the reuse and sharing
of conﬁguration ﬁles wherever possible. For exam-
ple, if Ellen has twenty identical workstations, they
should be able to share a common conﬁguration ﬁle,
but allowing machine-speciﬁc oddities (i.e., some
software package installed on only one machine).
Theconﬁgurationshouldthussupportselectivereuse
to reduces the opportunityfor operator error.
33 Tripwire design
The criteria we describe above represent the motiva-
tion for some of the key design issues behind Trip-
wire. Ultimately,thegoalofTripwireistodetectand
notify system administrators of changed, added, and
deleted ﬁles in some meaningful and useful manner.
However, the success of such a tool depends on how
wellitworkswithintherealitiesoftheadministration
environment. This includesappropriate ﬂexibilityto
ﬁt arange of securitypolicies,portabilitytodifferent
platforms in the same administrativerealm, and ease
of use.
3.1 Component overview
A high level model of Tripwire operation is shown
in Figure 1. This shows how the Tripwire program
uses two inputs: a conﬁguration describing the ﬁle
system objects to monitor, and a database of previ-
ously generated signatures putatively matching the
conﬁguration.
In itssimplestform, theconﬁgurationﬁle contains
a list of ﬁles and directories to be monitored, along
with their associated selection mask (i.e., the list of
attributesthatcan besafely ignoredif changed). The
database ﬁle is generated by Tripwire, containing a
list of entries with ﬁlenames, inode attribute values,
signature information, selection masks, and the con-
ﬁguration ﬁle entry that generated it.
3.2 Modes of Operation
In the four (mutually exclusive) modes of Tripwire
operation, program operation is driven by the con-
tents of the conﬁguration ﬁle, tw.config. Each
mode is described in turn below.
In database initialization mode, Tripwire gener-
ates a baseline database containing entries for every
ﬁle speciﬁed in the conﬁguration ﬁle, tw.config.
Each database entry contains the ﬁlename, inode at-
tributes, signature information, its selection mask,
and the conﬁguration entry that generated it. As en-
tries in tw.config can be directories, each entry
can map to many entries in the database.
In integrity checking mode, Tripwire reads the
tw.config ﬁle and generates a new database.
Tripwire then compares this database with the base-
line, producing a list of added and deleted ﬁles. For
those ﬁles that have changed, the selection mask
is applied to determine whether a report should
be generated. Note that the selection mask stored
in the baseline database is used, not the one in
tw.config, based on the premise that the base
databasehas beenstoredon somesecure media(e.g.,
read-only ﬂoppy).
When ﬁles change for legitimate reasons and
no longer match the baseline database description,
updating the baseline database becomes necessary.
Tripwire offers two modes to ensure database con-
sistency. In database update mode, Tripwire is given
alistofﬁlesorconﬁgurationentriesonthecommand
line. The database entries for these ﬁles are regen-
erated, and a new database written out. Tripwire
then instructs the system administrator to move this
database to secure media. In interactive database
update mode, Tripwire ﬁrst generates a list of all
changes (ala integrity checking mode). For each of
these changes, Tripwire then asks the system admin-
istrator whether the speciﬁed ﬁle or entry should be
updated.
3.3 Scalabilityaids
TripwireincludesanM4-likepreprocessinglanguage
[5] to help system administrators maximize reuse
of conﬁguration ﬁles. By including directives such
as “@@include”, “@@ifdef”, “@@ifhost”, and
“@@define”, system administrators can write a
core conﬁguration ﬁle describing portions of the ﬁle
system shared by many machines. These core ﬁles
can then be conditionally included in the conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle for each machine.
To allow the possible use of Tripwire at sites con-
sisting of thousands of machines, conﬁguration and
database ﬁles do not need to reside on the actual ma-
chine. Inputcanbereadfromﬁledescriptors,openat
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Figure 1: Diagram of high level operation model of Tripwire
the time of Tripwire invocation. These ﬁle descrip-
tors can be connected to UNIX pipes or network con-
nections. Thus, a remote server or a local program
can supply the necessary ﬁle contents. Supporting
UNIX style pipes also allows for outside programs to
supply encryption and compression services — ser-
vicesthatwedonotanticipateincludingasastandard
part of the core Tripwire package.
Tripwire does not encrypt thedatabase ﬁle so as to
ensure that runs can be completely automated (i.e.,
no one has to type in the encryption key every night
at 3 AM). Because the database contains nothing
that would aid an intruder in subverting Tripwire,
this does not undermine the security of the system.
However,ifTripwireisusedinanenvironmentwhere
the database is encrypted as a matter of policy, the
interface supports this, as described above.
3.4 Conﬁgurabilityaids
Tripwire makes a distinction between the conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle and the database ﬁle. Each machine may
share a conﬁguration ﬁle, but each generates its own
database ﬁle. Thus, identically conﬁgured machines
can share their conﬁguration database, but each has
its integrity checked against a per-machine database.
Because of the preprocessor support, system ad-
ministrators can write Tripwire conﬁguration ﬁles
that support numerous conﬁgurations of machines.
Uniform and uniquemachines are similarlyhandled.
Thishelpssupportreuseandminimizeuseroverhead
in installation.
The conﬁguration ﬁle for Tripwire, tw.config,
contains a list of entries, enumerating the set of di-
rectory (or ﬁles) to be monitored for changes, ad-
ditions, or deletions. Associated with each entry is
a selection-mask (described in the next section) that
describes which ﬁle (inode) attributes can change
without being reported as an exception. An excerpt
from aset of tw.config entriesisshowninFigure
2.
Preﬁxestothetw.configentriesallowforprun-
ing (i.e., preventing Tripwire from recursing intothe
speciﬁed directory or recording a database entry for
a ﬁle). Both inclusive and non-inclusive pruning are
supported;thatis, a directory’s contentsonlymay be
excluded from monitoring, or the directory and its
contents may both be excluded.
By default, allentries withinanamed directoryare
included when the database is generated. Each entry
is recorded in the database with the same ﬂags and
signatures as the enclosing, speciﬁed directory. This
allows the user to write more compact and inclusive
conﬁguration ﬁles. Some users have reported using
5# file/dir selection-mask
/etc R # all files under /etc
@@ifhost solaria.cs.purdue.edu
!/etc/lp # except for SVR4 printer logs
@@endif
/etc/passwd R+12 # you can’t be too careful
/etc/mtab L # dynamic files
/etc/motd L
/etc/utmp L
=/var/tmp R # only the directory, not its contents
Figure 2: An excerpt from a tw.config ﬁle
conﬁguration ﬁles of a simple /, naming all entries
in the ﬁle system!
The tw.config ﬁle also contains the names
of ﬁles and directories with their associated
selection-mask. A selection-mask may look like:
+pinugsm12-a. Flags are added (“+”) or deleted
(“-”) from the set of items to be examined.
Tripwire reads thisas, “Report changes in permis-
sionandmodes, inodenumber, numberoflinks,user
id, group id, size of the ﬁle, modiﬁcation timestamp,
and signatures 1 and 2. Disregard changes to access
timestamp.”
A ﬂag exists for every distinct ﬁeld stored in an
inode. Provided is a set of templatesto allowsystem
administratorstoquicklyclassifyﬁlesintocategories
that use common sets of ﬂags:
￿ read-only ﬁles Only the access timestamp is
ignored.
￿ log ﬁles Changes to the ﬁle size, access and
modiﬁcation timestamp, and signatures are ig-
nored.
￿ growing log ﬁles Changes to the access and
modiﬁcation timestamp, and signatures are ig-
nored. Increasing ﬁle sizes are ignored.
￿ ignore nothing self-explanatory
￿ ignore everything self-explanatory
Any ﬁles differing from their database entries are
then interpreted according to their selection-masks.
If any attributes are to be monitored, the ﬁlename is
printed, as are the expected and actual values of the
inode attributes. An example of Tripwire output for
changed ﬁles is shown in Figure 3.
A “quiet option” is also available through a
command-line option to force Tripwire to give terse
output. The output when running in this mode is
suitable for use by ﬁlter programs. This allows for
an external script to execute automated actions if de-
sired. One example would be to use the terse output
of Tripwire after a breakin to quicklymake a backup
tape of only changed ﬁles, to be examined later.
By allowing reporting to be dictated by local pol-
icy, Tripwire can be used at sites with a very broad
range of security policies.
3.5 Signature support
Tripwire has a generic interface to “signature3” rou-
tines and supports up to ten signatures to be used for
eachﬁle. Thefollowingdefaultmethodsareincluded
in the latest Tripwire distribution: MD5[11] (the
RSADataSecurity, Inc. MD5Message-DigestAlgo-
rithm), MD4[10] (the RSA Data Security, Inc. MD4
Message-Digest Algorithm), MD2 (the RSA Data
3We use the term signature to include checksums, message
digests,secure hash functions, and/orcryptographic signatures.
6changed: -rw-r--r-- root 20 Sep 17 13:46:43 1993 /.rhosts
### Attr Observed (what it is) Expected (what it should be)
### =========== ============================= =============================
/.rhosts
st_mtime: Fri Sep 17 13:46:43 1993 Tue Sep 14 20:05:10 1993
st_ctime: Fri Sep 17 13:46:43 1993 Tue Sep 14 20:05:10 1993
Figure 3: Sample Tripwire output for a changed ﬁle
Security, Inc. MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm),4
Snefru[9] (the Xerox Secure Hash Function), and
SHA (the NIST proposed Secure Hash Algorithm).
Tripwire also includes POSIX 1003.2 compliant
CRC-32 and CCITT compliant CRC-16 signatures.
Each signature may be included in the selection-
mask by including its index. Because each signature
routine presents a different balance in the equation
between performance and security, the system ad-
ministratorcan tailor the use of signatures according
to local policy. By default, MD5 and Snefru signa-
tures are recorded and checked for each ﬁle. How-
ever, different signatures can be speciﬁed for each
and every ﬁle. This allows the system administrator
great ﬂexibility in what to scan, and when.
Also included in the Tripwire distribution is
siggen, a program that generates signatures for
the ﬁles speciﬁed on the command line. This tool
provides a convenient means of generating any of
the included signatures for any ﬁle.
The code for the signature generation functions
is written with a very simple interface. Thus, Trip-
wire can be customized to use additional signature
routines,includingcryptographicchecksummethods
and per-site hash-code methods. Tripwire has room
for 10 functions, and only seven are preassigned, as
above.
4The copyrightonthe availablecodefor MD-2 strictly limits
its use to privacy-enhancedmail functions. RSA Data Security,
Inc. has kindly given us permission to include MD-2 in the
Tripwire packagewithout further restriction or royalty.
4 Experiences
Since the initial Tripwire release in November 1992,
seven subsequent versions have been released to in-
corporatebugﬁxes,supportadditionalplatforms,and
add new features. The authors estimate Tripwire is
being actively used at several thousand sites around
the world. Retrievals of the Tripwire distribution
fromourFTP serverinitiallyexceeded 300perweek.
Currently, seven months after the last ofﬁcial patch
release, we see an average of 25 fetches per week.
Thisdoesnotincludethecopiesbeingobtainedfrom
the many FTP mirror sites around the net.
We have received considerable feedback on Trip-
wire design, implementation, and use. We believe
thatversion1.1 ofTripwirehassucceeded inmeeting
most of the goals of system administrators needing
an integrity checking tool.
In this section, we present feedback from system
administrators that seem to validate the workability
of integrity checkers and present conjectures on the
prevalence and extent of system breakins. We also
preventnovelusesofTripwireandsurprisingconﬁg-
urationsthat havebeen reported tous. Feedback that
has shaped the direction of Tripwire development is
also presented.
4.1 First, the good news
:
:
:
We have gathered reports of at least seven cases
where Tripwire has alerted system administrators to
intruders tampering with their systems. In at least
two of these cases, the penetration was widespread,
7with numerous system programs and libraries re-
placed with trojan horses.
Potentially less exciting than these stories, but
equally inspiring, are the dozens of stories we have
received of sites using Tripwire as a system ad-
ministration enforcement tool. System administra-
tors report having found hundreds of program bina-
ries changed, only to ﬁnd that another person with
system-level access had made the changes without
following local notiﬁcation policy.
There has also been one reported case of a system
administrator detecting a failing disk with Tripwire.
The normal system loggingreporting the failure was
not read very often by the system administrator, but
the Tripwire output was surveyed daily.
All three classes of stories validate the theory
behind integrity checking programs. Although the
foundations of integrity checkers in UNIX security
have been discussed in [1, 2, 4], when Tripwire de-
sign was started in May 1992, no usable, publically
available integrity tools existed — providing one of
the primary motivationsfor writing Tripwire.
4.1.1 Where are all the bad guys?
The dramatically increased number of network
breakins throughout the Internet in early 1994 pre-
sented an opportunity to compare the prevalence of
system breakins at sites running Tripwire with those
sites that did not.5
One of us (Spafford) posted a query on USENET
asking whether any sites running Tripwire were suc-
cessfully subverted as described in the CERT advi-
sory. Surprisingly, no system administrator at any
sitereportedsuch abreakin. Why? Furthermore, out
of the thousandsof machines running Tripwire, why
have we heard of only seven Tripwire-discovered
breakins since 1992? We offer some possibilities:
￿ The intruders have given up: if the competence
and ambition of intruders have dropped since
5See,in particular,CERTadvisoryCA-94:01datedFebruary
3, 1994.
1992, the small number of reported incidents
could be explained away. However, this is not
consistentwiththe reports from response teams
andthefrequent advisoriesreportingnewly dis-
covered system vulnerabilites being exploited
by intruders.
￿ The sites running Tripwire are not interesting:
if sites running Tripwire offer nothing of inter-
est to an intruder, then one would expect few
breakin attempts. However, given that some of
thehighest-proﬁleUNIX sitesinthenation(e.g.,
public access UNIX sites, government informa-
tionservers,militarysites)arerunningTripwire,
this seems implausible.
￿ The site admins are not telling: it may be the
case that system administrators at sites where
breakins have occurred are not willingto tell us
thattheyhavebeen sucessfullyattacked. Thisis
possible considering the nature of many of the
sites running Tripwire, but we would expect at
least a few reports to be made in conﬁdence.
￿ Thesitesaremoresecurity-conscious: ifsystem
administrators running Tripwire are also con-
siderably more successful in securing their sys-
temsthanother UNIX sites, intruderswouldﬁnd
known vulnerabilities corrected, greater than
usual protection measures employed, and more
vigilance from system administrators. This
would explain the low number of reported in-
trusionincidents from a sample made up exclu-
sively of sites running Tripwire.
￿ The sites have already been attacked: the Trip-
wirebaselinedatabaseshouldbegeneratedfrom
acleandistribution;onethatisassuredtobefree
of trojan horses, logic bombs, etc. This usually
means reinstalling the operating system from
vendor-supplied media. However, this is of-
ten prohibitively inconvenient. If databases are
being generated on machines already compro-
mised, then Tripwire will have been installed
too late to have reported those critical ﬁle tam-
perings. If thisis the case, then manysites have
8not reported breakins because they continue to
be unaware of them.
￿ The intruders have completely subverted in-
tegrity checking schemes: changed ﬁles are
usually detected through the use of ﬁle signa-
tures. An intruder could be modifying ﬁles
in such a way that the resulting ﬁles preserve
theiroriginalsignatures. However, Tripwire in-
cludes seven signature routines, and the choice
of which signatures are used for any ﬁle is not
ﬁxed. That an intruder could be using such a
technique is possible, but the possibility is so
small as to be almost nonexistant.
Of the conjectures offered, the supposition most
credible is that system administrators who run Trip-
wire represent a poor sample for determiningsystem
breakins. A substantial portion of the thousands of
Tripwire e-mail messages we have received under-
score the competence and paranoia of these system
administrators.
However, despite these system administrators’
best intentions, their lack of available, trusted signa-
tures for critical operating system ﬁles is especially
noteworthy. Instead of installing a system from dis-
tributionmedia,theytypicallychoosea machinethat
they believe is “clean,” using it to generate the base-
line database. This assumption, however, may be
completely ungrounded. We know of at least one
case of a reported breakin at a site where system ad-
ministratorsdiscoveredthattheir“safe baseline”was
actually the ﬁrst to be attacked.
Webelievethatoperatingsystemdistributions,and
perhaps other software (e.g., compilers, system ad-
ministration tools), should be shipped with a com-
pletesignaturedatabase. Thisinformationcouldthen
bestoredlocallyonsomesecuremediaorofﬂine,and
then used in the event of a suspected breakin.
Not coincidentally, Tripwire could be used effec-
tively in such a role if software vendors supplied
a Tripwire-conformant database with their distribu-
tions. The Tripwire database is suited for such a
purpose: it is ASCII, mostly human readable, sim-
ple to parse and construct (21 ﬁxed ﬁelds), compact
(signatures are stored in base 64), self-contained (all
the database information is encapsulated in a single
ﬁle), and individualentries can be checked usingthe
siggen program.
4.1.2 How about the good guys?
“The mark of a good tool is that it is used
in ways that its author never thought of.”
6
As noted previously, many system administrators
areusingTripwire primarilyas atooltoenforce local
policy. When system administrationduties are dele-
gatedamongnumerouspeople,changesmadebyone
personoftengounnoticedand unexplainedtoothers.
RunningTripwire allowsthesechangestobe noticed
inatimelymanner—a goalverysimilartointrusion
detection.
Another application we note uses Tripwire to
help salvage ﬁle systems not completely repaired by
fsck, the program run at system boot that ensures
consistency between ﬁle data and their inodes. In
cases when ﬁle blocks cannot be bound to its ﬁle
name, they are placed in the lost+found direc-
tory and renamed to some (less than useful) number.
If a database of ﬁle signatures is available, this ﬁle
could be rebound to its original name by searching
the database for a matching signature.
Because providing a useful tool to system admin-
istratorswas oneofthegoalsof writingTripwire, the
variety of applications of Tripwire outside the do-
main of intrusion detection has been especially sur-
prising and satisfying for us. We are still collecting
other stories of novel use of the Tripwire package.
4.2 Stealth-Tripwire
Several site administrators have reported going to
considerablelengthstoconceal theoperationofTrip-
6Brian Kernighan has said this, in one form or another, in
several of his presentations and written works. This particular
versionwasinprivatee-mailtooneofusinresponsetoacitation
request.
9wire. These system administrators feel strongly that
they should not advertise their security measures or
policies.
As a result, Tripwire is not being run through pro-
grams like cron(8), the conventional means of
executing programs on a regular schedule. Instead,
a wide variety of local tools are used. For example,
a special daemon might be loaded at system startup,
waking only to run Tripwire at a scheduled time.
Where cron is used, deception through indirec-
tion is sometimes used to prevent an intruder from
immediately detecting evidence of Tripwire opera-
tion. In one case, a system administrator uses three
levels of indirection before ﬁnally executing Trip-
wire (e.g., cron runs a script that runs a script than
runs a script that runs Tripwire).
We wonder whether these measures to conceal
Tripwire are necessary, or even desirable. One of
us (Spafford) has heard of an “underground” publi-
cationwarningoftheneedforspecialvigilancewhen
attemptingtocrack systemsrunningTripwire. Ifthis
warningisheeded,thenthepresenceofTripwiremay
havetheabilitytodetercrackers. Advertisingtheuse
of Tripwire (even if not true) could thus help avert
attacks.
4.3 Security is nice, if it’s not too difﬁcult
Because Tripwire reports are only as reliable as its
inputs, the design document stresses the need to en-
sure the integrity of the baseline database. Thus,
we suggest that the baseline database be moved to
some secure read-only media immediately after it is
is generated.
ThemostcommonTripwireconﬁgurationreported
toustofacilitatethisistheuseof a “secure server,” a
specialized server receiving extra scrutiny from ad-
ministrators. A remote ﬁle system or server process
isthenusedtoexportthebaselinedatabasetoclients.
However, several sites have gone to much fur-
ther lengths to maintain the integrity of Tripwire
databases. Atleasttwositeshaveconsiderablymodi-
ﬁed Tripwiretosupportalternatechannelsforreceiv-
ing the database and transmitting the report, adding
layers for networking support, encryption, and host
authentication.
Since its original release, we have added full sup-
port for using open UNIX ﬁle descriptors to read the
Tripwire conﬁguration and database ﬁles. This al-
lows system administrators to easily add support for
encryption and compression without having to mod-
ify the Tripwire package so drastically. Instead, a
wrapper program (even a shell script) can be used
to supply these facilities. Used with named pipes,
wrapper scripts in Perl or Tcl, or simple network
clients this also allows centralized administration of
Tripwire checks in large installations.
It is interesting to note that mistrust of networked
ﬁle systems has motivated many of the enduser-
modiﬁcations to Tripwire. However, some of the
replacements we have have been told about sound as
if they include other weaknesses. A sound, portable
solutionto the problem has yet to appear.
4.4 Paranoia is unbounded
The Tripwire designdocument recommendsrunning
Tripwire in integritychecking mode on a regular ba-
sis (e.g., daily) to ensure that ﬁle system tampering
can be detected in a timely manner.
However, there have been two reported cases of
large sites running Tripwire far more frequently. In
fact, these experiences motivated the option of in-
cluding a signature selection feature to allow skip-
ping certain signatures by specifying choices on the
command line. Because these site admins were run-
ning Tripwire on their machines hourly with all sig-
nature checking enabled, the Tripwire runs were not
completed by the time the next Tripwire run started!
We were left wondering what these machines did
besides spending all the CPU cycles computing ﬁle
signatures. We also wonder why they placed so little
faith in their other security measures, and what level
of threat they were actually fearing.
In contrast is the lack of use of an ideal Tripwire-
aided bit of paranoia. One of the ideas be-
10hind Tripwire’s design (and the name itself) was
for system managers to scatter “plant” ﬁles on
their system, similar to what was done by Cliff
Stoll[12]. These ﬁles would have interesting names
(e.g., master-passwords), but useless contents.
These ﬁles would not normallybe accessed by users,
butmightbeprimetargetsforintruders. Bymonitor-
ing these ﬁles as “mini-tripwires,” it would be pos-
sible to detect an otherwise stealthy intrusion. We
have yet tohear of anyone usingthisschemeto good
effect.
4.5 Scalabilityincludessiteslargeand small
When designing Tripwire, we were more concerned
about the problems facing system administrators at
large sites. Although design considerations were
made for these conﬁgurations, how Tripwire was
used at small sites was more surprising.
4.5.1 Mega-Tripwire
Tripwire provides a conﬁguration language intended
toaidsystemadministratorsinmanaginglarger sites.
We were especially interested in how these tools
would be used by system administrators – the Trip-
wiredesigndocumentsuggeststhata core conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle could be shared by numerous hosts by using
the @@include directive.
From reports we have gathered, this appears to be
a less than popular method. Instead, system admin-
istrators create one conﬁguration ﬁle to be shared
by all machines, using the @@ifhost directive to
segregate non-common ﬁle groups.
We suspect that the overhead of tracking multi-
ple conﬁguration ﬁles outweighs the inconvenience
caused by ﬁles obfuscated by many “@@ifdef”
statements. These shared conﬁguration ﬁles are ap-
parentlystillmanageable, as thenumber ofentries in
the ﬁle is usually not large. (We suspect that if ﬁles
had to be individually enumerated, these conﬁgura-
tion ﬁles would be far larger, and therefore unman-
ageable.)
Tripwire has proven scalable, with documented
cases of sites of almost one thousand machines run-
ning Tripwire, as well as sites of only one machine.
That system administrators have done so using a
different mechanism than suggested in the design
document is especially interesting. That system ad-
ministrators are not slavishly following our design
document is reassuring.
4.5.2 Micro-Tripwire
How Tripwire is used on workstations with minimal
diskresourcesprovedsurprisinglyelegant. Although
the Tripwire conﬁguration ﬁle allows considerable
ﬂexibility in specifying ﬁles and directories to mon-
itor, conﬁguration ﬁles concocted by system admin-
istrators for these workstations consist of only one
character: “/”
Thusly, Tripwire scans all the local disk partitions
under the root directory, collecting the default MD5
andSnefrusignatures. Forsomesites,thishasproved
adequate for all their machines!
4.6 Running Tripwire on the Sasquatch
Kumquat Mark VIIa/MP
Tripwire has proven to be highly portable, success-
fully running on over 28 UNIX platforms. Among
them are Sun, SGI, HP, Sequents, Pyramids, Crays,
Apollos, NeXTs, BSDI, Lynix, Apple Macintosh,
and even Xenix. Conﬁgurations for new operat-
ing systems has proven to be sufﬁciently general
to necessitate the inclusion of only eight example
tw.config ﬁles.
However, potentially challenging situations result
whenwereceiverequestsfromsystemadministrators
askingfor help compilingTripwire on machines that
neitherofushaveeverheardof. Inonecase, thiswas
amachineonlysoldinAustraliaandshippedwithin-
correct system libraries. Other instances included an
especially ignoble machine that has not been sold
since 1986 (predating college for of us), and numer-
ousmachineswithnon-standardcompilers,libraries,
11system calls, and shells.
In all but two cases (of the last variety), we have
incorporated changes inTripwiresources toaccomo-
date these machines. In most cases, there has been
a sufﬁciently large group of system administrators
with similarly orphaned machines who put together
asuitablepatchtoallowcorrectTripwirecompilation
and operation.
It is interestingto analyze the time needed to fully
support a conﬁguration. Full support for Sun’s new
Solaris operating system was added two months af-
ter the initial Tripwire release. A workaround for
the two afforementioned Australian machines was
released six months after the problems were ﬁrst re-
ported. However, some Tripwire users running ma-
chines from a large workstation vendor continue to
be unable to ﬁnd a compiler that correctly generates
a Tripwire that passes the entire test suite; investi-
gation has determined that this is because of non-
standard andbroken compilersand librarieson those
platforms.
4.7 You added WHAT to Tripwire?
We recently received a report from a user who is
adding support for Intel machines running UNIX to
allow Tripwire to check mounted MSDOS ﬁle sys-
tems. In such a manner, they are using Tripwire to
check not onlyUNIX ﬁle systems,butalsotheir DOS
ﬁles (for viruses, etc.).
We also received, and are incorporating into a fu-
ture Tripwire patch release, a set of changes to allow
Tripwiretocheck theintegrityofsymboliclinks—a
weakness noted in [13]. One novel and elegant solu-
tion was implemented by storing the contents of the
symbolic link as a signature.7 Our actual solution
will involve taking the signatures of the link ﬁeld
contents.
We are especially pleased that system administra-
tors can so easily make feature additions that they
perceive as necessary. We believe this reﬂects well
7ThissolutionwasproposedandimplementedbyPaulSzabo
of the University of Sydney.
on the design and coding of the Tripwire release, al-
though we realize that the code is rather opaque in
many spots.
4.8 Static ﬁle systems aren’t
Accordingtosystemadministrators,theabilitytoup-
date Tripwire databases is among its most important
features. Files seem to change for many unforeseen
reasons. Consequently, the database is updated reg-
ularly. The additionof the interactive update facility
in Tripwire was among the most enthusiastically re-
ceived features.
Allowing database updates was a feature that we
resistedforseveralmonthsduringthebetatestperiod
in 1992. We believed (and still do, in part) that ease
ofupdatemayleadsomeadministratorstobecareless
in their storage of the database, thus weakening the
assurance Tripwire is capable of providing. That
users acquiesced and still used Tripwire despite its
lackofabilitytoupdatethebaselinedatabasewithout
regenerating theentire database astoundsthe authors
— in hindsight, at least.
5 Conclusions
Tripwire has proven to be a highly portable tool
thatsystemadministratorscanbuildusingcommonly
available tools. It is completely self-contained, and
once built, requires no other tools for execution.
Tripwireispublicallyavailable,iswidelydistributed,
and widely used.
Tripwire has been used by system administrators
in large and small sites: we have documented Trip-
wire’s active use at single machine sites, as well as
sites having several hundreds of machines. We have
yet to hear a report of a site where Tripwire was in-
stalled and then removed because it did not function
according to expectation, or because it was too dif-
ﬁcult to build or maintain. Coupled with the many
positive comments we have received, and the fact
that Tripwire has already caught several intruders,
leads us to conclude that our analysis and design are
12successful. We hope this effort serves as a model
for others who consider building security tools with
similar goals.
6 Availability
The beta version of Tripwire was made publically
available and posted to comp.sources.unix on
November 2, 1992 after three months of extensive
testing. Over three hundred users around the world
critiqued the four preliminary releases during Sum-
mer 1992, guiding the development towards a ship-
pable, publically available tool. The formal release
of Tripwire occurred in December of 1993.
Tripwire source is available at no cost.8 It has
appeared in comp.sources.unix (volume 26)
on Usenet, and is available via anonymous FTP
frommanysites,includingftp.cs.purdue.edu
in pub/spaf/COAST/Tripwire. Those with-
out Internet access can obtain information on ob-
taining sources and patches via e-mail by mailing
totripwire-request@cs.purdue.edu with
the single word “help” in the message body.
We regret that we do not have the resources avail-
abletomaketapesordisketteversionsofTripwirefor
anyone other than COAST Project sponsors. There-
fore, we ask that you not send us media for copies –
it will not be returned.
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